The eight papers in this book are drawn from two conferences that honored Lewis White Beck, an influential Kant scholar.

Anarchism is by far the least broadly understood ideology and the least studied academically. Though highly influential, both historically and in terms of recent social movements, anarchism is regularly dismissed. Anarchism: A Conceptual Approach is a welcome addition to this growing field, which is widely debated but poorly understood. Occupying a distinctive position in the study of anarchist ideology, this volume, authored by a handpicked group of established and rising scholars, investigates how anarchists often seek to sharpen their message and (...) struggle to determine what ideas and actions are central to their identity. Moving beyond defining anarchism as simply an ideology or political theory, this book examines the meanings of its key concepts, which have been divided into three categories: Core, Adjacent, and Peripheral concepts. Each chapter focuses on one important concept, shows how anarchists have understood the concept, and highlights its relationships to other concepts. Although anarchism is often thought of as a political topic, the interdisciplinary nature of Anarchism: A Conceptual Approach makes it of interest to students and scholars across the social sciences, liberal arts, and the humanities. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Previous research addressing the association between leisure and happiness has given rise to the hypothesis that informal social activities might contribute more to happiness than solitary activities. In the current study, we tested how the two types of leisure—social and solitary—contribute to a person’s subjective sense of well-being. For the empirical estimate, we used four consecutive quarters of data collected from 533 people over the age of 16, from 13 Tsimane’ hunter-farmer villages in the Bolivian Amazon. Results suggest that only (...) social, not solitary, leisure has a positive and statistically significant association with subjective well-being. The association between solitary leisure and subjective well-being was negligible or negative. Future research should focus on emic definitions of social and solitary time, for solitary time might not always be equivalent to leisure and productive group activities might substitute for social leisure. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Bergsonism and the History of Analytic Philosophy by Andreas VrahimisLeonard LawlorAndreas Vrahimis. Bergsonism and the History of Analytic Philosophy. History of Analytic Philosophy. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022. Pp. xix + 395. Hardback, $139.99.Bergsonism and the History of Analytic Philosophy is a great achievement in the history of ideas in general. The wealth of historical details that Andreas Vrahimis musters indicates that he has a profound understanding of twentieth-century (...) philosophy. More importantly, this book overflows with philosophical insights. The wealth of insights indicates that Bergsonism and the History of Analytic Philosophy is also a great achievement in philosophy as such. Andreas Vrahimis has written a remarkable book.Bergsonism and the History of Analytic Philosophy presents the origins of the division between analytic philosophy and continental philosophy. This story is familiar, with analytic philosophy siding with science and continental with poetry; with analytic philosophy being a kind of rationalism and continental a kind of irrationalism; with analytic philosophy using a writing style of dry, logical argumentation and continental using a writing style of images and emotions; and finally, with analytic philosophy writing only of what can be expressed and continental writing of the ineffable. Yet, Bergsonism and the History of Analytic Philosophy tells a story that is unfamiliar and even novel. The genealogy Vrahimis lays out is not of the rift between analytic philosophy and phenomenology (although this rift appears in the book's final chapters) but between analytic philosophy and Bergson. As Vrahimis clearly shows, the popularity of Bergson's thought at the beginning of the twentieth century caused the split, and even the hostility, between analytic and continental [End Page 332] philosophy. Therefore, Vrahimis does not title his book Bergson and the History of Analytic Philosophy, but Bergsonism and the History of Analytic Philosophy (2). Bergsonism is the popular view of Bergson's thought. It turned Bergson's thought into a "fad" (263). But Bergsonism contained many misunderstandings of Bergson. In the early twentieth century, Bergson was, in short, "a misunderstood celebrity." Unfortunately for Bergson's legacy, Bergson himself allowed Bergsonism to flourish as a cultural movement. Until The Creative Mind (published in 1934 in France as La pensée et le mouvant, after "the demise of Bergsonism"), Bergson never attempted to correct the misinterpretations of his thought that Bergsonism presented. Chapter by chapter, Vrahimis shows how the analytic philosophy criticisms leveled against Bergson are based in Bergsonism's distortions of Bergson's thought. The founding members of analytic philosophy aimed their attacks at a strawman Bergson.Bergsonism and the History of Analytic Philosophy's first three chapters set the stage for the analytic philosophers' attacks on Bergson. In fact, chapter 3 contains one of the clearest summaries of Bergson's thought I have ever read. Then, the book is arranged chronologically, starting with William James's 1905 "The Experience of Activity" in chapter 4 and ending with Ryle's 1958 "Phenomenology versus The Concept of Mind" in chapter 12. William James is not one of Bergson's critics. Chapter 4 shows how James praised Bergson's thought because of its similarity with pragmatism. This praise popularized Bergson's thought and thus led to Bergsonism. Chapters 4 through 12 (there is also a chapter 13 that serves as the book's conclusion) concern specific philosophers' criticisms of Bergson and then, in the final chapters, specific philosophers' criticisms of Lebensphilosophie and continental philosophy. There are chapters on Russell, Karin Costelloe-Stephen, L. Susan Stebbing, Neurath and the Vienna Circle (against Lebensphilosophie), Schlick (against Bergson as the originator of Lebensphilosophie), Carnap and Ayer (against Heidegger and Sartre), and Ryle (against Husserl). Most of the chapters concern the criticisms that resulted from Bergson's valorization of intuition as a source of knowledge. Bergson's definitions of intuition contribute to the belief that he is antiscience and an anti-intellectualist. Because intuition is introspection, it even suggests that Bergson's own philosophy is a kind of individualism. Because intuition is inexpressible, it also raises the problem that Bergson's own intuition of time as duration cannot be verified; rather, it can be challenged only by someone else's own intuition. Chapter 11 then shows how Heideggerian Angst challenges... (shrink)

Clayton Chin provides a helpful reconstruction of Rorty’s philosophy that aims to show its usefulness for political thought, while also shedding light on its relationships with Continental philosophy and on Rorty’s reading strategy employed in relation to some Continental thinkers. In relation to the first aim, Chin argues convincingly that Rorty’s primary contribution to political thought is located at the meta-theoretical level, by which he means the level at which questions may be asked about the nature and purpose of political (...) theorizing. I agree with much of Chin’s account of the nature and value of Rorty’s meta-theoretical approach. I am less convinced by Chin’s account of Rorty’s relations with Continental philosophy and the reading strategies employed in his discussions of those with whom he engaged. There are a number of reasons for this. First, he confines his discussion to a handful of figures that he groups under the heading of ontological approaches to politics and political theory: primarily Martin Heidegger and William Connolly, but also Foucault and Jürgen Habermas. Second, This is the asymmetry in the way in which Rorty is treated compared to the discussion of these interlocutors. (shrink)

Growing evidence suggests mothers invest more in girls than boys and fathers more in boys than girls. We develop a hypothesis that predicts preference for girls by the parent facing more resource constraints and preference for boys by the parent facing less constraint. We test the hypothesis with panel data from the Tsimane’, a foraging-farming society in the Bolivian Amazon. Tsimane’ mothers face more resource constraints than fathers. As predicted, mother’s wealth protected girl’s BMI, but father’s wealth had weak effects (...) on boy’s BMI. Numerous tests yielded robust results, including those that controlled for fixed effects of child and household. (shrink)

Religious thought often assumes that the principle of physical causal completeness (PCC) is false. But those who explicitly deny or doubt PCC, including William Alston, W. D. Hart, Tim Crane, Paul Moser and David Yandell, Charles Taliaferro, Keith Yandell, Dallas Willard, William Vallicella, Frank Dilley, and, recently, David Chalmers, have ignored not only the explicit but also the implicit grounds for acceptance of PCC. I review the explicit grounds, and extend the hitherto implicit grounds, which together constitute a (...) greater challenge to contemporary religious philosophy than has been realized. Religious philosophers need to find a better way around PCC than has been found, or, if PCC is unavoidable, religious philosophers need to work toward a worldview that both accepts PCC and defends strong forms of religious experience. (shrink)

A new era has emerged in research on entheogens largely due to clinical trials conducted at Johns Hopkins University and similar studies sponsored by the Council for Spiritual Practices. In these notes and queries, I reflect on implications of these developments for psychological studies of religion and on what this research may mean for Christian churches in the United States. I conclude that the aims and methods of this research fit well within Jamesian efforts of contemporary psychology of religion to (...) assess religious practices by their fruits for life. Furthermore, some communitarian religious concerns that religious experiences occasioned by entheogens pose risks to the integrity of religious community are shown to be largely unfounded. However, it is suggested that certain risks for religious life posed by all investigations/interventions by knowledge experts—in particular, the colonization of the religious life world and the commodification of its practices—also attend these developments for Christian churches. Additionally, risks of individual harm in the use of entheogens appear to be significant and, therefore, warrant earnest ethical study. (shrink)

Human rights are a suspect project – this seems the only sensible starting point today. This suspicion, however, is not absolute and the desire to preserve and reform human rights persists for many of us. The most important contemporary critiques of human rights focus on the problematic consequences of the desire for universal rights. Some defenders of human rights accept elements of this critique in their reformulations, but opponents remain wary of the desire to think and act in human rights (...) terms because of their limitations as a political ethics. Yet, we hesitate to abandon human rights. In this article, I look at the political critique of human rights in greater detail. I argue that an agonistic account drawing on the work of William Connolly and Bonnie Honig offers the best response to the most important contemporary critiques of human rights, and a clearer account of what it means to claim that human rights do valuable work. The key developments of this agonistic view of human rights are its focus on the ambiguity of ‘humanity’ as a political identity and the challenge to legitimate authority and membership that new rights claims make. In the end, human rights are defended as a universal political ethos focused on the pluralization and democratization of global politics. (shrink)

I begin this paper by discussing the difference between outweighing and canceling in conflicts of normativity. I then introduce a thought experiment that I call Crash Drive,and I use it to explain the nature of a certain kind of moral conflict as well as the appropriate emotional response – regret – on the part of the primary agent in this case. Having done this, I turn to a line of criticism opened by Bernard Williams and recently expanded by Jonathan Dancy (...) according to which archetypal examples of modern moral philosophies such as Kantianism cannot make sense of conflict and regret. Finally, I examine the general structure of such theories and explain how at least some of them can avoid this line of criticism. (shrink)